VITA VISSUTA

By the time the United States declared its “pivot to Asia” in 2011, the logic seemed unassailable. The center of gravity of the global economy was shifting east. China was rising rapidly. American officials argued that sustained engagement — economic, diplomatic and military — would anchor U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific and prevent Beijing from reshaping the regional order. Fifteen years later, that ambition looks frayed.

“The pivot to Asia has failed,” the foreign policy scholar Zack Cooper writes in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs (link). It is a blunt assessment of what was once a bipartisan strategic consensus. The rebalance, first articulated by President Barack Obama and affirmed by his successors, promised that the United States would be “all in.” Instead, the gap between rhetoric and resources widened.

The original strategy rested on three pillars: security, prosperity and governance. Only one remains standing (not): the economic retreat.

At the heart of the economic agenda was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade pact designed not only to deepen commercial ties but also to set rules for the regional economy before China could do so. Its collapse — first stalled in Congress, then abandoned by President Donald J. Trump in 2017 — left a vacuum Washington has yet to fill.

Subsequent initiatives lacked the central incentive Asian partners sought: meaningful access to the American market. Meanwhile, tariffs remained in place, and trade policy turned increasingly inward.

For governments across Southeast Asia, the calculation is pragmatic. China is their largest trading partner. The United States is their primary security guarantor. As long as Washington offered both security and economic integration, the balance held. When the economic pillar weakened, so did America’s gravitational pull.

Asian officials often repeat a careful phrase: they do not want to choose between Washington and Beijing. But in practice, the range of options narrows when economic dependency deepens on one side. Let’s see if there is still anything left among the balance between governance and credibility.

The governance pillar — democracy promotion, anti-corruption initiatives and institutional leadership — eroded. American efforts to elevate democratic norms alienated some governments. Later, Washington’s own shifting relationship with international rules and institutions created unease among allies and partners accustomed to a more predictable United States.

Credibility in Asia functions as a form of capital. It accumulates slowly and dissipates quietly. Opinion surveys in key countries such as Japan and South Korea have shown declining confidence in American leadership in recent years, reflecting not hostility but uncertainty.

Uncertainty, in strategic environments, carries consequences: security is the last anchor, and today, as Cooper notes, “military deterrence is all that remains of U.S. strategy in Asia.”

The 2025 National Security Strategy placed extraordinary emphasis on China and the defense of Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait has become the focal point of American regional policy, overshadowing broader engagement in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Yet even deterrence has grown more fragile. American forces are stretched across multiple theaters. China has expanded its naval capabilities and intensified military pressure around Taiwan. In the South China Sea, Beijing has resumed land reclamation and maritime patrols.

The result is a narrowing conception of U.S. interests: a defensive posture concentrated along the so-called first island chain — Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines — rather than a comprehensive regional strategy.

Strategists now debate how far retrenchment might go. A pullback to the second island chain, centered on Japan, Guam and Australia, would reduce direct exposure but effectively concede much of East Asia to Chinese influence. Few policymakers publicly advocate such a move, but the discussion underscores the scale of strategic recalibration underway.

Even consolidation along the first island chain presents dilemmas. Allies such as Japan and the Philippines would need to expand defense spending and deepen operational integration with American forces. South Korea, surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors, faces growing domestic debate about its own deterrent options.

If allies begin to doubt the durability of U.S. commitments, they may seek alternatives — closer accommodation with Beijing, independent military buildup or, in extreme scenarios, nuclear capabilities.

None of this guarantees Chinese dominance. Beijing confronts demographic decline, economic headwinds and diplomatic pushback from wary neighbors. Strategic overreach remains possible. But influence in Asia often rests less on ideology than on consistency. China’s economic presence is deeply embedded across the region. Infrastructure financing, trade integration and sustained diplomatic engagement provide continuity.

The United States, by contrast, appears selective. Its security commitments remain formidable, but its economic and political engagement has narrowed.

In many Asian capitals, the question is no longer whether America is powerful. It is whether America is steady. Is this the end of grand strategy?

The original pivot envisioned a long-term investment in the region’s political and economic architecture alongside military deterrence. That comprehensive approach required sustained resources and bipartisan commitment. Neither proved durable. Retrenchment may now be less a choice than a recognition of limits.

The challenge for Washington is to define clearly what it will defend and what it will not — a task fraught with risk. Strategic ambiguity has long been a tool of deterrence. But excessive ambiguity invites testing.

As Asia recalibrates, governments are not waiting for Washington’s internal debates to conclude. They are hedging, diversifying and preparing for a future in which American leadership may be narrower than once promised.

The pivot was meant to secure America’s place in the region shaping the 21st century. Instead, it has left a thinner, more defensive posture — and a quieter question echoing across the Indo-Pacific: how much of Asia comes after America?

Photos: B&W across Asia, Leica M11 Monochrom, Leica M7 and Tmax400.